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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the stock market’s reaction to JetBlue’s Initial Public Offering 
(1PO) and subsequent price movements of the stock. In particular, w’e examine 
whether the euphoria surrounding JetBlue’s IPO carried over to other firms in the 
sector by testing whether the shares of JetBlue’s competitors showed a significant 
price reaction to JetBlue’s IPO. JetBlue’s IPO tooh place just a few months 
following September I I ,  2001. These events resulted in dramatic changes in the 
airline industry and had significant implications on the economic gains of airlines. 
We examine JetBlue’s accounting and stock performance and compare it to the 
relative performance of Southwest Airlines (SWA), a representative of the loa-cost 
carrier group. In addition, we compare both JetBlue’s and SWA’s financial condition 
and the relative performance of their stock to two mainline U S .  carriers, Continental 
and Northwest. representatives of the conventional-cost carrier group. We analyze 
whether there are any performance differences among the low-cost carriers and 
between low-cost carriers and conventional-cost carriers. In particular, w’e examine 
whether low-cost carriers were able to sustain the economic impacts of 9/11 better 
than the conventional-cost carriers. 
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“Keep an eye on JelBlue. That could prove to be a successful operation” 
Herb Kelleher, Co-founder, Southwest Airlines (Top Entrepreneurs, 200 I ,  p. 84) 
INTRODUCTION 
JetBlue Airways was one of the best-funded start-up airlines in U.S. 
aviation history. Its initial capitalization was $130 million. The airline was 
founded in early 1999 by David Neelman, who is currently its Chief 
Executive Officer. Before JetBlue David Neelman founded Morris Air and 
after selling Morris Air to Southwest Airlines (SWA) served as an executive 
vice president of SWA. He also worked as a consultant for West Jet 
Airlines. 
JetBlue started operations in February 2000 and went public in April 
2002, in what was described as one of the most successful initial public 
offerings (IPO) of the year. Following a very successful road show for its 
IPO, JetBlue, in connection with its lead underwriters Morgan Stanley and 
Merrill Lynch, filed several amendments to its initial S-I filing with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in which it revised its offering 
price upward from an initial price range of $22 - $24 to $27 per share. 
JetBlue sold 5.87 million shares at this price, raising more than $158 million 
for the firm. Despite the upward revisions in the firm’s offering price, 
JetBlue’s stock soared another 67 percent and closed at $45 on its first day of 
trading (Boorstin, 2002). 
During 2001, JetBlue’s second year of operation, and arguably one of 
the worst in U.S. aviation history, the airline turned profitable, earning $38.5 
million on revenues of $320 million. This fact alone may explain why 
JetBlue’s shares were in very high demand. Only two other airlines in the 
U.S. were also profitable in 2001: SWA and AirTran. Although experiencing 
a stock price deciine since its highs in June 2002, jetfiiue has stood up weii 
to its expectations, increasing sales in 2002 to $635 million with a year-end 
profit of $49 million. 
This paper examines the stock market’s reaction to JetBlue’s IPO and 
subsequent price movements of the stock through the present. In particular, 
we look at whether the euphoria surrounding JetBlue’s IPO carried over to 
other firms in the sector by examining whether the shares of JetBlue’s 
competitors showed a significant price reaction to JetBlue’s successful IPO. 
We focus on the relative performance of the stock and compare it with the 
stock performance of a similarly successful low-cost carrier, SWA, and two 
mainline full-service U.S. carriers, Continental and Northwest. These 
airlines are used as comparison baselines. The mainline full-service carriers 
were picked randomly and based on the fact that, to date, neither has filed for 
bankruptcy protection as a result of the systemic shocks of the events of 
September 1 1,2001 (9/11). 
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We find JetBlue’s accounting and stock performance to be significantly 
better than that of its mainline conventional-cost rivals, Continental and 
Northwest, but in similar lines with its low-cost rival SWA. Based on this 
finding, we assert that there is something unique to the low-cost model, 
which both SWA and JetBlue follow, that sets them apart from their 
conventional-cost competitors and renders them more successful in difficult 
market conditions. We do not advocate that the low-cost model is 
monolithic. In many ways JetBlue resembles a younger, smaller version of 
SWA (Boorstin, 2002). Like SWA, JetBlue flies busy routes between 
secondary airports, has a low-cost structure, and emphasizes customer 
service. But while SWA usually sticks to a single region, JetBlue flies cross- 
country. And while SWA is based at Dallas’ smaller airport, Love Field, 
JetBlue is based at New York’s Kennedy International Airport (JFK). 
Furthermore, SWA can be characterized as a low-frills airline, whereas 
JetBlue is a lifestyle seller with more finesse, even though both are low-fare. 
Our argument is that the low-cost model, in its generic manifestation, 
can be differentiated from the conventional-cost model along three 
dimensions. These dimensions, coupled with some unique operational 
features that low-cost airlines have (which will be identified in the next 
paragraph), help explain, theoretically, why low-cost carriers outperform 
their conventional-cost rivals. These dimensions are: (a) adopting a viable 
strategic position, (b) leveraging organizational capabilities, and (c) re- 
conceiving the value equation (Lawton, 2002). 
Low-cost airlines establish a viable strategic position in the market by 
finding an appropriate strategy that acts as a mediating force between them 
and the environment in which they operate. For example, both SWA and 
JetBlue serve price- and convenience-sensitive passengers only. Low-cost 
airlines, once they establish their position, move toward securing their 
competitive advantage by capitalizing on capabilities that cannot be used by 
rivals. These capabilities are quality in customer service, operational 
efficiency, innovation, and responsiveness to customers. 
Zom (200 1) advances the argument that low-cost carriers are more 
resilient than conventional-cost carriers in times of economic downturn. Our 
analysis focusing on JetBlue’s performance validates this point, and Zorn’s 
analysis helps us demonstrate it theoretically. Zorn cites several reasons for 
the resilience of low-cost carriers in times of recession: first, lower overall 
and more variable cost structures; second, lower breakeven load factors; and, 
third, business and leisure traveler migration from conventional-cost airlines 
to low-cost airlines. Our financial analysis substantiates this point to its 
fullest. We found that markets value low-cost airline stocks (focusing on 
JetBlue and SWA) as growth stocks, whereas conventional-cost airline 
stocks are treated as cyclical. Even though affected, low-cost carriers 
emerged from 9/1 I in a stronger market position than their full-fare rivals. 
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What interests us from an academic point of view is the relative 
confidence of the public in JetBlue’s stock (as measured by price 
movements) right after the IPO, as compared to both SWA and the mainline 
carriers. We build a model, test several hypotheses on why there was stock 
performance divergence, and explain these differences based on the data, 
controlling for extraneous variables. 
The paper is organized as follows. The first section briefly describes the 
series of events surrounding our period of analysis and sets the stage for our 
analysis. The second section discusses JetBlue’s strategy and the state of the 
airline industry in the U.S. during the period of our analysis. The third 
section describes the data. The fourth section explains the methodology used 
to test several hypotheses concerning the performance of JetBlue’s stock. 
The results are presented in the fifth section and the findings are summarized 
in the final section. 
JETBLUE AND THE STATE OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 
JetBlue’s strategy is to combine common sense with strategic and 
operational innovation through the use of the most appropriate technology to 
“bring humanity back to air travel” (Gittell & O’Reilly, 2001, p. 2). To 
accomplish this, JetBlue aimed to be one of the first completely paperless 
airlines, deploying information technology for every single aspect of its 
operations from flight operations and maintenance to ticketing and 
reservations. The two pillars of JetBlue’s strategy are efficiency and service. 
According to its founder, David Neelman, “We like to think of ourselves as 
customer advocates. We believe that all travelers should have access to high 
quality airline service at affordable fares” (Gittell & O’Reilly, 2001, p. 2). 
JetBlue’s hub city, New York City, represents a very large population center 
at the heart of several underserved markets. More specifically, New York 
City lacked the service by a low-cost carrier; therefore, fares were, on 
average, quite high and its true traffic potential unrealized. JetBlue chose 
JFK, a slot controlled and heavily used airport, as its hub, which was quite 
an unconventional choice for a low-cost, start-up carrier that would normally 
opt for a smaller airport as its basis of operations. When JetBlue moved to 
JFK, the slot controls were only in effect from 3:OO p.m. to 8:OO p.m., while 
the rest of the day JFK was underutilized. Furthermore, more terminal space 
was opening up at the airport due to TWA’s reduction of operations at JFK. 
Thus, JetBlue was able to secure slots, through political concessions, without 
going through the process of purchasing them from one of the airlines 
already holding these slots. 
JetBlue operates a single-type aircraft, the A320 series made by Airbus 
Industries. Through the use of a single-type aircraft, JetBlue realizes 
operational savings in the areas of maintenance and crew training. Every 
JetBlue mechanic can work on any aircraft and every pilot can fly any of 
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JetBlue’s planes. JetBlue’s operational strategy includes quick aircraft 
turnarounds, which help in improving operational performance and, thus, 
efficiency by maximizing aircraft utilization. JetBlue keeps its planes in the 
air longer than any other airline, more than 12 hours a day. Only SWA 
comes close to this, with about 1 1 hours of block time. 
JetBlue’s cost per available seat mile in 2002, seen on Figure 1, was 5.3 
cents. This was the lowest in the US. airline industry. For example, the cost 
for US Airways was more than double (11 cents), United 10.4 cents, and 
American 9.2 cents. These three topped the chart and two of them (US 
Airways and United) filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 in the 
months following 9/11. The cost for Northwest was 8.2 cents and 
Continental 7.9 cents, the two conventional-cost airlines that we used for the 
baseline comparison. SWA had the second lowest cost per available seat 
mile to JetBlue with 6.3 cents. 
US Airways 
United 
American 
Figure 1. Cost per available seat miles, in cents: U.S. major 
carriers comparison, 2002 
1 1  0 
10 4 
9 2  
JetBlue has built its corporate culture, discussed on its Web site at 
http://www.jetblue.com/workhere/culture.html, around five core values: 
Safety, Caring, Integrity, Fun, and Passion. The airline is non-unionized. 
This is quite an unconventional practice in the U.S. airline industry, 80 
percent of which is unionized.. JetBlue follows a customized human resource 
management approach that tailors jobs, pay, and benefit packages to the 
different needs of distinct employee groups rather than the more 
conventional, universal type human resource management system. 
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DATA 
We use accounting data from January 1996 to March 2003. We 
collected this data from quarterly lOQ filings’, which are available online 
through the SEC’s “Edgar Online” database (http://www.edgar-online.com). 
For our analysis of relative stock performances pre- and post-JetBlue’s IPO, 
we use daily price data (adjusted for dividends and stock splits) from January 
2000 to April 2003, which we retrieved from the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) database from the University of Chicago Graduate 
School of Business (http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/research/crsp). To measure 
market performance during our sample period, we use the CRSP value- 
weighted market index. 
Finally, we use weekly 3-month Treasury Security indexes as calculated 
by the Treasury Department and reported by the Federal Reserve in 
publication H. 15 as a proxy for the risk-free interest rate during our sample 
period (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h 15). Since August 2 1, 2000, 
the Federal Reserve’s Publication H. 15 no longer reports yield data for the 
13-week (3-month) U.S. Treasury Bill auction average. Starting from this 
date, we use Treasury security yields adjusted to a constant maturity of 3 
months, as provided by the Treasury’s Public Debt Web site 
(http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov). 
METHODOLOGY 
Financial markets bring together potential investors who vote every day 
on the future profitability of the firm and the relative merits of managers’ 
strategic decisions. Simply put, if investors think that corporate decisions 
wiii iead to increases in iong-run profitabiiity, news of events such as a 
takeover will cause a firm’s stock price to rise. Conversely, news that 
investors believe will lower future profits will result in a fall in a f m ’ s  
equity value. 
The finance literature refers to the idea that news is quickly impounded 
in security market prices as the efficient market hypothesis, first described by 
Fama, Fisher, and Jensen (1969). The assumption that markets are efficient 
implies that security prices reflect all relevant information known to 
investors and thus provide us with the best estimate of a firm’s future 
profitability. There is significant empirical support of the efficient market 
’ IOQ filings are quarterly company reports filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 
IOQ reports provide detailed information on a firm’s quarterly earnings results and must be sent 
to the Securities and Exchange Conitnission within 45 days of the end of the quarter. 
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hypothesis including the Carter and Simpkins’ (2002) study of airline stocks 
following 911 1. 
If we assume that markets are efficient, and therefore set rational prices, 
we can measure whether the corporate strategy of such low-cost carriers as 
JetBlue and SWA, post-9/1 1, was in the best interest of shareholders by 
examining the firms’ profitability and stock price performance in the months 
after 911 1 and compare them to the performance of other airlines that follow 
a conventional-cost business model (Continental, Northwest). Our 
methodology follows the event study procedure described in Brown and 
Warner (1989, Peterson (1989), and Schweitzer (1989). Event study 
methodology measures the abnormal return of the stock, the difference 
between the actual return and the expected return, around the time of the 
event. If an announcement such as news of increased profits is taken as 
good news, abnormal returns will be positive, signaling the market’s belief 
that firm value has increased. A negative abnormal return is evidence of bad 
news, indicating that the market believes the event will decrease the firm’s 
future profitability. 
To estimate the abnormal return of a stock on day t, we subtract the 
expected return on the stock from its actual return on that day: 
Where: 
AR, is the abnormal stock return; 
R, is the actual stock return; and 
E(RJ is the expected stock return, all on day t. 
In turn, we assume that the return of a stock is conditional on the return 
of the market and model E(R,) as: 
Where: 
E(Rm,t) is the expected return of the market on day t; 
RJt represents the risk-free rate as measured by the return on 90-day 
t is the estimated slope coefficient from a linear regression of the stock’s 
U.S. Treasury Bills on day t ;  and 
past returns on the returns of the market. 
Equation 2 is also called the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and is 
based on Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). In this paper, we estimate the 
CAPM using both 60 and 360 daily returns that precede our event window. 
We employ a linear market model that illustrates the relationship between 
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JetBlue’s stock return and the market (as proxied by the CRSP value- 
weighted market index) during a normal period. 
We calculate daily abnormal returns for JetBlue and the other three 
airlines following JetBlue’s IPO on April 12,2002. In addition, we measure 
cumulative abnormal returns, CARrrrn,  the sum of abnormal returns over a 
window of n days: 
Cumulative abnormal returns enable us to measure the market’s reaction 
to the performance of the airline in a time frame that encompasses the entire 
period from the event under study to the present. 
Earlier industry research has largely focused on airline stock returns 
following a plane crash. Davidson, Chandy, and Cross (1987) find 
statistically significant negative returns for airlines on the day of the crash. 
This appears to be a short-term effect, however, and is reversed on the days 
following the event. Chance and Ferris (1987) examined 46 plane crashes, 
and discovered that in 29 cases the carrier had a significant negative return. 
A crash does not appear to have an effect beyond the initial reaction, nor 
does it affect the stock price of the airline’s competitors. Chance and Ferris 
also found a negative correlation between the airline’s abnormal return and 
the number of fatalities in the crash. 
More recently, Carter and Simpkins (2002) investigated the stock 
market’s reaction to the tragedies of 9/11. They noted the potential 
psychological effects of the attack and tested whether financial markets 
reacted rritirimally tc news of the event. Carte: am! Simpkins faund that 
despite the psychological horrors the market was able to discern among 
airlines based on fm characteristics, including the ability to cover short- 
term obligations. Their results support rational pricing and have important 
implications for our work, which seeks to examine JetBlue’s financial 
performance and stock performance in the aftermath of 9/1 1. 
To serve as a hrther control in estimating the market’s reaction to 
JetBlue’s performance post 911 1, the analysis compares the abnormal returns 
of JetBlue’s stock to the abnormal returns of SWA, on one hand, and 
Northwest and Continental, on the other hand. We choose SWA because it 
uses a low-cost business model similar to that of JetBlue, and Continental 
and Northwest because they use a conventional-cost business model and 
have done so quite successfully. These firms should provide a good 
benchmark for examining the industry’s reaction to JetBlue’s successful IPO 
and help us answer the question of whether JetBlue’s IPO was able to instill 
new hope in an industry sector that was otherwise devastated by the events 
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of 9/11. We do not consider United Airlines and US Airways since they 
weathered financial difficulties and eventually filed for bankruptcy 
protection under Chapter 11  during our sample period. American Airlines, 
too, came very close to filing for Chapter 1 1.  
Adjusting for Risk: The use of Beta as a Measure of Systematic Risk 
In considering risk changes, we calculate beta, the part of a firm’s risk 
that is related to changes in the market. Beta is a measure of systematic risk, 
the risk that investors must be compensated for, and, thus, is related to a 
firm’s cost of capital. If 9/11 led to the airline industry being a more risky 
business, we would expect the betas of airline stocks to increase after 9/11. 
The calculation of each airline’s beta, can be found from the following 
formula: 
Where: 
cOv(r; ’ ) is the covariance between firm i’s returns and returns on 
the market; and 
is the variance of market returns. 
Cornell, Hirshleifer, and James (1997) reviewed several practical issues 
in beta selection and the application of regression-based asset-pricing models 
to estimating equity cost of capital. They provide assistance for resolving 
many of the conventional problems with beta estimation, such as selection of 
the risk-free rate, the time period for estimation, and the inclusion or 
exclusion of dividends. 
Corgel and Djoganopoulos (2000) perform direct statistical comparisons 
of beta estimates calculated by large financial data vendors such as 
Bloomberg, Compustat, Dow Jones, and Ibbotson, They find that the 
different procedures used by these commercial services produce the same 
results when simple tests of differences of means are used to evaluate them. 
They observe that most data vendors use ordinary least squares regressions 
of the returns of the firm against those of the market, where the security’s 
return serves as the dependent variable, and the independent variable is a 
user-selected index. They point out, however, that users of financial software 
packages typically have some flexibility and can select the time period for 
estimation, the market index against which they want to measure returns, the 
data frequency (daily, weekly, monthly, etc.), and whether they want to 
include dividends or not. 
Because the fmance literature is divided on the issue whether short-term 
or long-term estimates should be used in CAPM estimation, we use a rolling 
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window of both 60 and 360 calendar day returns to calculate covariances and 
variances. Although there is no consensus on what time period should be 
used to estimate beta, most authors and financial data vendors use long-term 
betas calculated over periods of three and more years. However, given the 
limited data availability for young firms such as JetBlue and the rapidly 
changing environment for the airline industry, we found short-term estimates 
to be more appropriate. 
Expected Market Returns: Historical versus Prospective Estimates 
Before we can address the question of how we estimate expected market 
returns, we have to define what we mean by market. In his famous critique 
of CAPM testing, Richard Roll (1977) indicates that the market portfolio to 
be used in CAPM estimation should contain all financial and non-financial 
assets available to investors and states that an accurate test of the CAPM will 
never be possible because of this requirement. 
Despite Roll’s criticism, most authors and financial data services use 
only U.S. common stocks to proxy for the market portfolio and rely heavily 
on the Standard and Poor’s 500 (S&P 500) index to represent the market. 
Because Taylor and Paolone (1997) and Corgel and Djoganopoulos (2000) 
observe that the power of the regressions producing the betas improve 
noticeably when a broader market index than the S&P 500 is used, we 
decided to use the CRSP value-weighted market index for calculating both 
our beta estimates and market returns. The CRSP value weights index 
covers more than 10,000 publicly traded U.S. firms, and is extensively used 
in the financial literature. 
Furthermore, when developing an estimate of the expected market return 
E(R,,J, one has to decide whether to use historical data, assuming that past 
performance is the best predictor of future performance, or make an attempt 
to forecast a return for the market, which would require an accurate estimate 
of future dividend growth. As with most other studies in this field, we do not 
consider ourselves wise enough to forecast future market returns, but rather 
we rely on past returns as an estimate of future returns. Another question we 
had to address in our estimation was which time period to use to calculate 
past market returns. Given the fact that both the events of 9/11 and JetBlue’s 
IPO occurred relatively recently and that our return data after both events is 
limited, we decided to use the geometric average of market returns during 
the past 360 calendar days as an estimate of future market returns. To test the 
robustness of our results, we also calculated 60-calendar-day returns, but 
arrived at the same conclusions as we did with our long-term estimates. 
In a long-term study of historical market risk premiums, Ibbotson and 
Sinquefield (1976) find that the average risk premium for the S&P 500 index 
during the period from 1929 to 1976 was about 8.4 percent. During our 
sample period from January 1996 to April 2003, we find a similar market 
risk premium of 8.15 percent. A closer examination reveals, however, that 
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the market risk premium pre-9/11 was 14.9 percent, influenced in part by the 
booming economy during the 1990s and the 199912000 stock market bubble, 
and that it dropped to - 19.4 percent after 91 1 1. 
RESULTS 
Accounting Performance 
The first part of our analysis focuses on the relative performance of 
JetBlue and its competitors from an accounting standpoint, by comparing 
various accounting measures and financial ratios for the four firms over time. 
An analysis of the stock performance of the four airlines follows in the next 
section. 
Table 1. Selected accounting data and financial ratios for selected airlines, 
2000-2003 
Time Period 2000 200 1 2002 2003-Ql 
Panel A: JetBlue 
Total Revenue ($M) 104.6 320.4 635.2 217.1 
Net Income ($M) (21.3) 38.5 54.9 17.4 
Current Ratio 0.7 0.7 1 .0 1.0 
Quick Ratio 0.6 0.7 1 .0 1 .0 
Return on Assets (ROA) -6.2% 5.7% 4.0% 4.8% * 
Return on Equity (ROE) n.m. n.m. 13.2% 16.0% * 
Profit Margin n.m. n.m. 8.6% 8.0% 
Asset Turnover Ratio 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.7 * 
Accounts Receivable 
Turnover Ratio 4.8 15.4 43.0 47.3 * 
Interest Coverage Ratio -6.4 7.9 5.5 5.9 
Panel B: Southwest Airlines 
Total Revenue ($M) 5,649.6 5,555.2 5,521.8 1.35 1.0 
Net Income ($M) 
Current Ratio 
Quick Ratio 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
Return on Equity (ROE) 
Profit Margin 
Asset Turnover Ratio 
Accounts Receivable 
Turnover Ratio 
Interest Coverage Ratio 
603.1 
0.6 
0.6 
9.0% 
17.5% 
10.7% 
0.8 
34.0 
15.6 
511.1 241.0 
1.1 1.6 
1.1  1.4 
5.7% 2.7% 
12.7% 5.4% 
9.2% 4.4% 
0.6 0.6 
47.2 31.7 
12.9 5.4 
24.0 
1.5 
1.4 
1.2% * 
2.0% * 
1.8% 
0.5 * 
37.0 * 
3.1 
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Table 1. Selected accounting data and financial ratios for selected airlines, 
2000-2003 (continued) 
Time Period 2000 2001 2002 2003-41 
Panel C: Continental Airlines 
Total Revenue ($M) 9,899.0 8,969.0 8,402.0 nla 
Net Income ($M) 
Current Ratio 
Quick Ratio 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
Return on Equity (ROE) 
Profit Margin 
Asset Turnover Ratio 
Accounts Receivable 
Turnover Ratio 
342.0 
0.8 
0.7 
3.7% 
29.5% 
3.5% 
1.1 
15.7 
(95.0) 
0.7 
0.6 
- I  .O% 
-8.2% 
-1 .1% 
0.9 
15.0 
(441.0) 
0.8 
0.7 
-4. I %  
-57.5% 
-5.2% 
0.8 
15.5 
n/a 
nla 
nla 
n/a 
nla 
nla 
nla 
nla 
Interest Coverage Ratio 3.3 0.6 -0.9 nla 
Panel D: Northwest Airlines 
Total Revenue ($M) 11,415.0 9,905.0 9,489.0 nla 
Net Income ($M) 256.0 (423.0) (798.0) n/a 
Current Ratio 0.6 0.9 0.8 nla 
Quick Ratio 0.5 0.8 0.8 nla 
Return on Assets (ROA) 2.4% -3.3% -6.0% n/a 
Return on Equity (ROE) 1 10.8% n.m. n.m. nla 
Profit Margin 2.2% n.m. n.m. nla 
Asset Turnover Ratio 1 .o 0.8 0.7 nla 
Accounts Receivable nla 
Turnover Ratio 17.8 15.6 12.4 
Interest Coverage Ratio 2.2 -1.0 -2.0 nla 
n.m. =not meaningful 
* = annualized 
Note: We used income statements from quarterly company reports, 1.e. I O Q  tilings with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission which are available online through the SEC’s “Edgar 
Online” database (http://www.edgar-online.com), to calculate all ratios. First quarter-2003 data 
was not yet available for Continental and Northwest at the time of our analysis. Whenever 
meaningful for comparison purposes, we annualized (Le., projected) the first-quarter-2003 ratios 
for JetBlue and Southwest for the entire year. 
The accounting figures and financial ratios in Table 1 are based on 
quarterly IO-Q filings from January 2000 to the present. As we can see, 
JetBlue managed to grow revenues and net income consistently during our 
sample period despite 9/11. SWA managed to remain profitable on slightly 
declining sales, while Continental and Northwest registered significant 
losses on falling revenues. 
JetBlue’s liquidity ratios (current ratio and quick ratio) are mostly below 
those of SWA, but exceed those of Continental and Northwest. The 
profitability ratios [return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and 
profit margin] of JetBlue are comparatively healthy after 9/1 I ,  although they 
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remain below the profitability levels that SWA showed in 2000 before 9/11. 
SWA experienced a considerable decline in its profitability after 911 1, while 
Continental and Northwest show very strong signs of weakening. 
JetBlue’s activity ratios (asset turnover and accounts receivable 
turnover) increased significantly during our sample period, while they 
deteriorated somewhat for the other three airlines. JetBlue remains well able 
to cover its interest expenses, as is reflected by its interest coverage ratio that 
remains well above 5 after 9/11. While SWA’s interest coverage ratio drops 
significantly during our sample period (from 15.6 in 2000 to 5.4 in 2002), 
the financial impact of 9/11 on Continental and Northwest’s ability to make 
their interest payments is tremendous: both airlines have negative ratios in 
2002, indicating that both airlines have significant difficulties making their 
interest payments. 
Stock Performance 
In order to examine whether investors put more confidence into low-cost 
carriers such as SWA than into airlines that follow a conventional-cost 
model such as Continental or Northwest, we examine the stock price 
performance of the three airlines in the aftermath of 9/11. In particular, we 
examine how the industry reacted to JetBlue’s highly successful IPO on 
April 12, 2002, in which JetBlue’s stock soared about 67 percent during its 
first day of trading in an otherwise uneventful IPO year. Table 2 presents 
quarterly and yearly returns for the four airlines and the market as proxied by 
the CRSP value weighted market index. 
The data clearly show the impact of 911 1 on the airline industry and the 
market. We observe a highly negative return for the airlines and the market 
index during the third quarter of 2001, followed by six quarters of high 
volatility when compared to the pre-9/11 period. Continental was hardest hit 
during the third quarter of 2001 and most of 2002, while SWA 
underperformed the market to a much lesser extent. 
Since the returns in Table 2 are not adjusted for risk, we cannot yet draw 
any conclusions about the significance of these performance differences. To 
measure differences in risk levels between the airlines and examine how 
those risk levels changed after 911 I ,  we calculate beta coefficients for the 
airlines pre-9/11 and post-9/11. The resulting beta estimates are presented in 
Table 3.  
Panel A presents our beta estimates for two subperiods: ( I )  fiom 
January I ,  2000, to September I O ,  2001 (pre 9/1 I ) ;  and (2) fiom the 
resumption of trading on September 17,2001, to March 3 I ,  2003 (post 9/1 I ) .  
For JetBlue, we started our estimation from the closing price on its first day 
of trading on April 12, 2002. In Panel B, we report test results for the 
equality of means and medians across groups: p-values are reported for the 
significance of difference in means and Mann-Whitney p-values are reported 
for Mann-Whitney tests for the significance of difference in medians. These 
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tests are based on 60-day trailing betas calculated for each firm. Although 
not reported here, we also calculated betas using longer estimation periods. 
We observe similar, highly significant increases in systematic risk for our 
long-term estimates. 
Table 2. Quarterly and yearly return data, for selected airlines, 2000-2003 
JetBlue South- North- Market 
Quarter west Continental west Index ** 
2000-4 1 nla 29.13% -7.89% 1.66% 2.65% 
* 
2000-42 nla -8.97% 15.02% 34.57% -3.17% 
2000-43 nla 28.04% -3.36% -19.32% -0.88% 
2000-44 nla 38.34% 13.62% 22.64% -8.42% 
nla 20.12% 3.86% 7.87% -2.54% 2000 Total 
200 1 -4 1 n/a -20.58% -19.81% -24.90% -10.81% 
200 1-42 nla 4.18% 18.96% 11.63% 5.36% 
200 1-43 nla -19.73% -69.54% -54.81% -14.49% 
200 1-44 nla 24.58% 74.73% 37.60% 9.43% 
nla -4.63% -15.59% -15.03% -3.16% 200 1 Total 
2002-4 1 nla 4.72% 8.05% 2 1.46% 0.48% 
2002-42 nla -16.46% -44.28% -36.76% -13.29% 
2002-43 - 1  1.46% -19.14% -65.84% -44.61% -16.98% 
2002-44 0.4 1% 6.44% 34.51% 9.88% 8.41% 
-5.71% -6.85% -27.48% -17.3 1% -5.90% 2002 Total 
2003-QI 2.63% 3.38% -29.38% -5.99% -3.57% 
JetBlue went public on April 12, 2002. Thus, quarterly return data is not available until the third 
quarter (43) of 2002. 
** Quarterly and yearly return data on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value- 
weighted market index. Calculations are performed using daily closing price data obtained from 
the CRSP from the University of  Chicago Graduate School o f  Business database 
(http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/research/crsp). All returns are adjusted for dividends and stock 
splits. 
Not surprisingly, we find that the beta coefficients of SWA, Continental, 
and Northwest increased considerably after 911 1.  We tested whether the 
increase was significant using a standard t-test for differences in means and a 
Mann-Whitney test for the significance of differences in medians. Although 
the beta of SWA increased less than that of Continental and Northwest, we 
find that all increases are significant at the one percent confidence level. 
JetBlue’s beta, calculated from price data available after its IPO, is only 
0.72, well below the betas of SWA ( I .  14), Continental (2.19) and Northwest 
(1.71). 
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To calculate how the returns compare between the airlines after 
adjusting for risk, we employed event study methodology and calculated the 
risk-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns for each airline before and after 
JetBlue’s IPO in a CAPM framework. Table 4 provides an overview of the 
data that were used to calculate expected returns. We used 90-day U.S. 
Treasury Bill rates as a proxy for the risk-free rate and historical market 
returns based on 60 and 360 calendar days to forecast expected market 
returns. The last row of Table 4 provides the standard deviation of our 
estimates, indicating that the short-term estimates are significantly more 
volatile than long-term historical returns. 
Table 3. Differences in risk levels between selected airlines, before and after 
September 11,2001 
JetBlue Southwest Continental Northwest 
Panel A: Estimated Beta Coefficients 
Pre-9il I nla 0.77 0.73 1.01 
Post-91 1 1 0.72 1.14 2.19 1.71 
Panel B: Tests for Equality Across Groups 
p-value n/a 0.001 * 0.000 * 0.000 * 
MW p-value nia 0.002 * 0.000 * 0.000 * 
* Signilicant at the one percent confidence level 
Note: We estimate beta coefficients for the four airlines in our sample as 
p, = cov( q ,  y, ) / g:, where cov( r, , r, ) is the covariance between the returns of firm i 
and the returns on the market, and 0: is the variance of market returns. We use daily returns 
based on adjusted price data of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value- 
weighted market index to proxy for market returns and price data for individual firms that has 
been adjusted for dividends and stock splits (http:llgsbwvw.uchicago.edu/research/crsp), 
~ 
We base our calculations on weekly 3-month Treasury Security indexes 
as calculated by the Treasury Department and reported by the Federal 
Reserve (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h 15). Since August 2 1, 
2000, the Federal Reserve’s Publication H. 15 no longer reports yield data for 
the 13-week (3-month) US. Treasury Bills’ auction average. Starting from 
this date, we use Treasury security yields adjusted to a constant maturity of 3 
months, as provided by the Treasury’s Public Debt Web site 
(http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov). In our later estimations, we calculate 
historical market returns as the geometric average of daily market returns 
during the previous 60 (360) calendar days. These returns are used as a 
forecast of the expected market return in our CAPM estimation. All returns 
below are aggregated by quarter and are not those actually used in our 
estimation. We also report the standard deviation for each column. In the 
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case of Treasury Bills, the standard deviation is based on weekly data; for all 
other series we report the standard deviation for daily returns. 
Table 4. Return estimates used in the capital asset pricing model, by quarter, 
I 
2000-2003 
Average 90-Day Market Return Market Return 
Treasury-Bill During Previous During Previous 
Quarter Rate 60 Days 12 Months 
2000-4 1 5.72% 7.99% 14.42% 
2000-Q2 5.68% 24.26% 13.07% 
2000-Q4 5.84% -2 I .  8 1 YO 4.65% 
2000-43 6.21% 12.46% 10.81% 
2000 Average 5.86% 5.72% 10.74% 
2001-Q 1 4.32% - 14.2 1 % -6.50% 
200 1 -Q2 3.55% 4.21% - 14.77% 
200 1-03 2.39% -23.29% -17.73% 
200 1-Q4 1.73% -8.01% -2 1.42% 
2001 Average 3.00% - 10.32% - 15.10% 
2002-4 1 1.82% 13.03% - 12.72% 
2002-42 1.71% -12.87% -9.68% 
2002-43 1.65% -45.61% -20.45% 
2002-44 1.18% 22.12% - 17.66% 
2002 Average 1.59% -5.83% - I 5.13% 
2003-4 1 1.17% - 19.63% -22.25% 
St. Dev. 1.56% 45.80% 2 1.20% 
Note: This table presents quarterly summary statistics for the variables used in our estimation of 
the capital asset pricing model. 
Table 5 presents non-risk-adjusted returns of the airlines for various 
time periods after 4ii i and JetBiue’s PO. We observe tinat aii airiines were 
negatively impacted by the events of 9/11, with Continental performing the 
worst, losing over 49 percent on the first trading day following 9/11 and over 
89 percent within 18 months of 911 1. In comparison, SWA lost only 24 
percent on the first trading day after 9/11 and about 27 percent within 18 
months. All airlines show a medium-term recovery three to six months after 
9/11, with SWA actually registering a 16 percent gain during that period. 
When examining the stock market’s reaction to JetBlue’s successful 
IPO, we find that all airlines showed sizable gains on JetBlue’s IPO date. 
Within one year of its IPO, JetBlue held on to most of its first-day gains and 
dropped only 2.9 percent from its closing price on April 12, 2002. All other 
airlines performed considerably poorer, with Continental still being the 
hardest hit. Thus, while creating some short-term euphoria for the airline 
industry, JetBlue’s IPO does not appear to have taken investors’ eyes off the 
long-term effects of 9/11 that continued to erode investor confidence in the 
airline industry following JetBlue’s IPO. 
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Table 5. Non-risk-adjusted returns following JetBlue’s initial public offering, 
April 12,2002 -April 12,2003 
Time 
Elapsed JetBlue Southwest Continental Northwest Market 
1 Day 66.7% * 5.0% 5.9% 4.4% 0.7% 
2 Weeks -0.3% 0.3% -3.8% 2.1% -1.0% 
1 Month 4.9% -8.4% -24.0% -16.1% -4.4% 
2 Months 8.0% -7.0% -29.8% - 19.8% -7.8% 
3 Months -6.3% -26.1% -55.9% -47.5% -15.7% 
6 Months -20.7% -33.4% -84.3% -69.5% -26.7% 
I Year -2.9% -19.1% -77.8% -64.7% - 18.9% 
JetBlue’s 66.8% return on its first day of trading represents its Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
underpricing level, that it, it is measured relative to the IPO offering price. The long-term (Le., 2 
weeks to I year) return calculations for JetBlue do not include this underpricing but are 
calculated relati\e to JetBlue‘s closing price on its first da) of trading (April 12, 2002). The 
returns are adjusted for stock splits and dividends, but not for risk 
Table 6. Risk-adjusted returns using short term estimates, following JetBlue’s 
initial public offering, April 12,2001, to April 12,2002 
JetBlue Southwest Continental Northwest Time Elapsed 
2 Weeks d a  * -4.65% -8.88% -0.33% 
1 Month nla * -8.19% -23.73% - 12.26% 
2 Months nla * - 12.79% -46.44% -28.44% 
3 Months - I 4.4 1 Yo -29.90% -86.83% -63.79% 
6 Months -36.85% -25.16% -168.00% * *  -1O5.09% ** 
1 Year 6.70% -0.51% -96.89% -62.44% 
The risk-adjusted short-term returns cannot be calculated for JetBlue because we require 60 
days of past performance to estimate JetBlue’s beta. 
** Returns of less than -100% appear nonsensical at first, but may occur in a risk-adjusted 
cumulative return context. 
Note: This table presents risk-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns during various time periods 
following JetBlue’s Initial Public Offering (IPO) on April 12, 2002. We calculate daily 
abnormal returns as the difference between actual returns observed on each trading day minus 
expected returns based on the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). The results in this table 
represent a shorr-rum approach to estimating the variables for the CAPM: we use 60-calender- 
duy trailing betas for each firm and estimate market risk premiums by using 60-calender-day 
historical returns on the Center for Research on Security Prices value-weighted market index 
minus interpolated average yields on 90-day Treasury Bills during each week. 
Table 6 presents risk-adjusted returns following 911 1 using 60-day 
trailing betas and market risk premiums estimated using 60-day historical 
returns. Although negative in the short run, we find that the risk-adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for SWA are positive in the medium 
and long run (2 to 18 months after 9/11). Although Continental and 
Northwest show some positive CARs in the medium term (3 to 6 months 
Flouris and Walker 55 
after 911 I), they become negative in the long run. Following JetBlue’s IPO, 
we find that JetBlue and SWA again outperformed Continental and 
Northwest, with JetBlue actually having positive CARS within one year of its 
IPO. 
Table 7 presents a long-term approach for estimating the inputs in our 
CAPM model. Here, we calculate risk-adjusted retums by using 360-day 
trailing betas and market risk premiums based on 360-day historical returns. 
The results are similar to those presented in Table 6. SWA outperforms 
Continental and Northwest on a risk-adjusted basis after 911 1 and after 
JetBlue’s IPO. 
Table 7. Risk-adjusted returns using long-term estimates, following JetBlue’s 
initial public offering, April 12,2001, to April 12, 2002 
Time Elapsed JetBlue Southwest Continental Northwest 
2 Weeks n/a * -5.06% -9.5 1 Yo - 1.48% 
1 Month n/a * -7.94% -23.35% -12.47% 
2 Months n/a * -12.27% -45.28% -28.08% 
3 Months n/a * -30.59% -86.87% -64.54% 
6 Months n/a * -32.58% -175.21% ** -113.25% ** 
1 Year nla * -4.95% -98.08% -64.54% 
Note that the risk-adjusted long-term returns cannot be calculated for JetBlue because we 
require 360 days of past performance to estimate JetBlue‘s beta. 
** Returns of less than -100% appear nonsensical at first, but may occur in a risk-adjusted 
cumulative return context. 
Note: This table presents risk-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns during various time periods 
following JetBlue’s Initial Public Offering (IPO) on April 12, 2002. We calculate daily 
abnormal returns as the difference between actual returns observed on each trading day minus 
expec!ed i e h m s  hsed on !he c~pi!.! ISSP! pricing mode! (CAPM) The rezults in this table 
represent a long-/erm approach to estimating the variables for the CAPM: we use 360-calender- 
day trailing betas for each firm and estimate market risk premiums by using 360-calender-day 
historical returns on the Center for Research on Security Prices value-weighted market index 
minus interpolated average yields on 90-day Treasury Bills during each week. 
CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding the fact that JetBlue has been an innovative operation 
and, as the numbers and our analysis shows, quite successfd, will it be able 
to maintain its success, in the future, through long periods of sustained 
growth? What would it take for JetBlue to meet its growth targets while 
maintaining productivity and flexibility? These questions cannot be 
successfully answered without an appropriate passage of time that will 
ultimately validate JetBlue’s model. 
We explain JetBlue’s overall success (and that of other low-cost 
carriers) from an operational standpoint through its lower and more variable 
cost structure, its lower breakeven load factor, and the business and leisure 
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traveler migration from conventional-cost airlines to low-cost airlines. Our 
financial analysis substantiates this point to its fullest. We find that markets 
value low-cost airline stocks as growth stocks, whereas conventional-cost 
airline stocks are treated as cyclical. Even though affected, low-cost carriers 
emerged after 9/11 in a stronger market position than their conventional-cost 
rivals. From a management standpoint, we believe that adopting a viable 
strategic position, leveraging organizational capabilities, and re-conceiving 
the value equation are critical in defining the comparative advantage of low- 
cost carriers. 
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